Social Anatomy of Action

Toward a Responsibility-Based Conception of Agency

 

Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 1997

 

 

by

 

Katarzyna Paprzycka

 

 

 

 

 

 

Preliminary matter

Table of Contents

INtroduction......................................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Action as a Unit of Conduct.................................................................................................................................. 1

2. Two Main Problems................................................................................................................................................. 5

3. A Preview.................................................................................................................................................................. 8

Chapter I.

Is Explanatory Individualism Conceptually Necessary?...................................................... 13

1. Individualism vs. Nonindividualism about Action Explanations................................................................... 14

2. Individualism, Nonindividualism and Evolution............................................................................................... 24

3. Arguments for Explanatory Individualism......................................................................................................... 26

4. Normative Individualism....................................................................................................................................... 39

Chapter II.

The Challenge of Hartís Theory of Action...................................................................................... 50

1. Two Kinds of Action Theories............................................................................................................................ 51

2. H.L.A. Hartís Theory of Action........................................................................................................................... 53

3. The Fundamental Problem: The Concept of Action is Prior to the Concept of Responsibility................. 57

4. Against Ascriptivism............................................................................................................................................ 60

Chapter III.

Practical Responsibility I: Normative Expectations................................................................ 64

1. Normative vs. Descriptive (Predictive) Expectations....................................................................................... 65

2. Normative Expectations........................................................................................................................................ 69

3. Fulfilling Normative Expectations: Actions and Performances....................................................................... 70

4. Moral vs. Practical Normative Expectations...................................................................................................... 73

5. ĎIt is (would be) reasonable to expect of a that a jí........................................................................................ 74

Chapter IV.

Practical Responsibility II: Two Concepts of Reasonableness........................................... 79

1. Two Concepts of Reasonableness...................................................................................................................... 80

2. Reasonableness as an External Standard........................................................................................................... 86

3. Reasonableness, Conflict and Contrary Expectations..................................................................................... 89

Chapter V.

Practical Responsibility III: ReasonableA Normative Expectations............................... 94

1. When Are Normative Expectations Prima Facie ReasonableA?...................................................................... 94

2. Defeating Conditions.......................................................................................................................................... 102

3. Some Objections.................................................................................................................................................. 113

4. Defeating Defeating Conditions........................................................................................................................ 118

Chapter VI.

Actions, Omissions, and Mere Happenings....................................................................................... 128

1. A Preview.............................................................................................................................................................. 128

2. What Has Been Done: Two Senses of the Question..................................................................................... 131

3. What Has Been Done?........................................................................................................................................ 135

4. Actions and Mere Happenings......................................................................................................................... 148

5. Wayward Causal Chains..................................................................................................................................... 158

Chapter VII.

Selectional Force of Reasons................................................................................................................ 164

1. Davidsonís Challenge......................................................................................................................................... 166

2. Selectional Explanations..................................................................................................................................... 171

3. Reasons as Selectional Criteria.......................................................................................................................... 178

4. Explanatory Nonindividualism Again............................................................................................................... 203

5. Two Further Problems......................................................................................................................................... 214

6. Objections............................................................................................................................................................. 221

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................................... 229

Appendices:.......................................................................................................................................................... 233

Appendix A.The Asymmetry Thesis...................................................................................................... 233

Appendix B. Action As a Performance Intentional Under a Description................... 241

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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